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Tri-County Equipment & Leasing v. Klinke, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33 (June 28, 
2012)1 
 
EVIDENCE – ADMISSIBILITY OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
 
Summary 
 
The court considered whether proof of workers’ compensation payments paid in 
California could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because both 
states have statutes governing this issue, the Court decided that the Nevada statute shall govern. 
Applying Nevada law, the Court concluded that evidence of the actual amount of the benefits 
paid should be admitted and a clarifying jury instruction should have been given.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The payments of workers’ compensation benefits in California did not create a conflict of 
laws issue when the injured party brought suit in Nevada. Nevada Law governed, and therefore, 
NRS 616C.215(10) applied, and workers’ compensation benefits paid may be admitted into 
evidence as an exception to the collateral source rule. Furthermore, a jury instruction should be 
given clarifying how to calculate damages with regards to the actual amount paid to medical 
providers. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Respondent Angela Klinke (hereinafter “Klinke”) brought a personal injury claim against 
appellant Tri-County Equipment & Leasing (hereinafter “Tri-County”) in Nevada. Klinke’s 
vehicle was struck by a generator towed by a Tri Country truck. At the time of the accident, 
Klinke was in Nevada. However, she was a California resident, employed by a California 
company and was acting in the course of her employment.  
 
Klinkereceived California’s workers’ compensation benefits from her employer. Klinke’s 
medical providers and workers’ compensation carrier negotiated a deal where the medical 
providers would accept as full payment for their services an amount less than billed, which is 
commonly referred to as a “write down.”  
 
Before trial, both parties filed motions in limine regarding the write down and workers’ 
compensation payments. Klinke sought to exclude the evidence of the payments and the write 
down under the collateral source rule, which generally renders evidence of a collateral source of 
payment for an injury inadmissible, and argued that NRS 616C.215
2
 did not apply. Tri-County 
argued the payments were admissible under NRS 616C.215. The district court found that NRS 
616C.215 did not apply because the payments were made pursuant to California law. However, 
the lower court did not discuss the applicability of California law.  
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 NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.215 governs the admissibility of workers’ compensation payments.  
Klinke was awarded damages that totaled $27,510. That award included $17,150 for 
medical expense. Because of the write down, Tri-County moved to have the amount reduced to 
what was actually paid. The district court denied the motion. Tri-County appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 
Justice Hardesty wrote for the Court sitting en banc. Justice Gibbons wrote a separate 
opinion with which Justice Cherry concurred. On appeal, Tri-County reasserted its argument that 
workers’ compensation benefits are admissible as an exception to the collateral source rule.3 
Because both California and Nevada had an interest in the outcome of the case, the Court 
addressed whether a conflict of law analysis was necessary.  
 
In order to determine whether there is a conflict of laws, the Court must first determine 
whether a conflict of laws actually exists.
4
 Klinke’s workers’ compensation benefits would have 
been admissible under the laws of either state; therefore, no conflict of laws existed.
5
  
 
Nevada recognizes a limited exception to the collateral source rule for workers’ 
compensation benefits under NRS 616C.215 (10).
6
 NRS 616C.215(10) directs that “[i]n any trial 
of an action by the injured employee . . . against a person other than the employer or a person in 
the same employ, the jury must receive proof of the amount of all payments made or to be made 
by the insurer or the Administrator [of the Division of Industrial Relations].”7  A jury instruction 
then must be given to follow the court’s damages instructions without reducing any award by the 
amount of workers’ compensation paid. This instruction benefits both the plaintiff and defendant 
by preventing the jury from speculating as to any workers’ compensation benefits received. NRS 
616C.215(10) uses the language “any trial,” meaning it is applicable universally in trials 
involving plaintiff’s receiving workers’ compensation benefits.  
 
The Court analyzed a similar issue addressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the distinction of which state workers’ 
compensation benefits were paid made no difference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina concluded in favor of preserving a universal rule, so workers’ compensation benefits 
paid in another state were admissible in actions against third parties.
8
 
 
In the instant case, the Court found the primary purpose of the statute was to avoid 
confusing the jury; therefore, the statute should not be construed so narrowly as to only be 
applied to workers’ compensation benefits paid in Nevada. The workers’ compensation 
payments made to an injured employee must be admitted as evidence and the proper instruction 
regarding the jury’s consideration of those payments must be given. Therefore, pursuant to NRS 
616C.215(10), the evidence of the amounts actually paid should have been admitted and the 
clarifying instruction given. 
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  Because the amount of workers compensation payments actually paid necessarily 
incorporated the written down medical expenses, the court concluded that it was not necessary to 
resolve whether the collateral source rule applied to medical provider discounts in other contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Because both California and Nevada have statutes governing the admissibility of 
workers’ compensation benefits, the Court decided that the Nevada statute shall govern. 
Applying Nevada law, the Court concluded that evidence of the actual amount of the benefits 
paid should be admitted and a clarifying jury instruction should have been given. The Court 
reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded for further proceedings.  
 
 
